Developing a shared strategic culture for European defence 

In September 2017 President Emmanuel Macron suggested a European Intervention Initiative (EI2) as part of his vision of a “sovereign, united and democratic Europe”. Some commentators labelled his proposal, which stands outside of existing structures (e.g. the European Union), as the launching of a European intervention force. In reality, EI2 is aimed at bringing able and willing European countries together to prepare themselves better for future crises – not by creating a new standby force but by ultimately creating a shared strategic culture. At the invitation of France, ten European countries have joined the initiative.

The key challenge is how a shared strategic culture can best be achieved.

The key challenge is how a shared strategic culture can best be achieved. To answer that question, this report will start with a short background description of EI2 and what has been achieved so far, followed by an analysis of what constitutes a ‘strategic culture’. Based on that analysis the ten EI2 countries will be assessed according to several criteria related to their current national strategic cultures.

Strategic cultures are notoriously resilient to change, but can particular entry points for strategic cultural convergence be identified that make the most impact? The report concludes with recommendations on these entry points in order to best achieve a shared strategic culture. 

About the authors

Dick Zandee is Head of the Security Unit at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on security and defence issues, including policies, defence capability development, research and technology, armaments cooperation and defence industrial aspects.

Kimberley Kruijver is Junior Research Fellow at the Clingendael’s Security Unit. Her research concentrates on (European) security and defence matters.

Improved military mobility has been identified as one of the flagships for EU-NATO cooperation. Both organisations have a vested interest in being able to rapidly move defence forces, equipment and supplies across Europe.

In this report, the authors identify and map the relevant stakeholders in this essential field of cooperation. Subsequently, the way in which the EU and NATO have been working together so far, in general as well as in this specific area, is analysed.

Will the issue of improving cross-border military movement prove to be the silver bullet for solving the EU-NATO cooperation conundrum?

About the authors

Margriet Drent is Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute’s Security Unit. She specialises in European security and defence with a specific focus on EU Common Security and Defence Policy.

Kimberley Kruijver is Junior Research Fellow at the Clingendael’s Security Unit. Her research concentrates on (European) security and defence matters.

Dick Zandee is Head of the Security Unit at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on security and defence issues, including policies, defence capability development, research and technology, armaments cooperation and defence industrial aspects.

Authors: Tarja Cronberg (Sipri), Sico van der Meer (Clingendael)

Full title: Working Towards a Successful Policy Brief NPT 2020 Review Conference

Date of Finalization: September 2017

Progress Lot 4, 2017

Description:

The 2015 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty failed to reach any consensus. The issues which gave rise to tensions in 2015 have not been resolved, with the inherent risk that the next Review Conference will fail as well. In this policy brief three options are presented here to increase the possibilities for the 2020 Review Conference to succeed.

First, it could be discussed whether the traditional focus on one final consensus document at the end of a Review Conference can be changed, so that tensions on certain topics do not block everything else as well.

Second, new explorations are required to solve the deadlock on the aim to establish a WMDFree Zone in the Middle East.

Third, the nuclear weapons states should show more willingness in accelerating their disarmament efforts, for which some smaller and bigger steps are identified.