Towards an EU Geopolitical Approach on Transformative Terms in the Western Balkans

This policy brief assesses the EU response after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, asking how the EU can pursue a geopolitical EU enlargement approach while maintaining its transformative objectives. The brief first provides a concise assessment of the instruments that the EU employs to strengthen democratic resilience and to counter Russian influence in the three countries. We argue that the EU has a comprehensive and effective range of instruments available, even if Russia has maintained its ability to project especially ‘soft’ power. However, when looking at the overall EU political approach towards these countries, we observe negative effects of the manner in which geopolitical imperatives for enhanced engagement are currently converted into strategy and discourse. More specifically, an insufficiently overarching firm and confident EU political approach towards the Western Balkans undermines the transformative potential of the EU’s impressive toolbox for the region. The brief concludes that by becoming more confident and upfront, sticking to its values and making use of negative conditionality besides offering positive incentives, the EU can pursue a more effective geopolitical approach on transformative terms towards the Western Balkans.

The Author

Wouter Zweers - Clingendael Institute 

Milena Rossokhatska - PhD Candidate at the University of Amsterdam 

This Policy Paper addresses a paradox in cohesion policy. Despite being one of the most evaluated EU policies, a culture of transparent, independent, and effective auditing has not emerged. The question needs to be asked why evaluations do not lead to change in outputs and the required improvements. Evidently there are (national) interests that block reforms. Yet, this does not provide a sufficient explanation as in other EU policy areas comparable difficulties existed before new structures were implemented and the issues were solved.

Competition for EU funds is increasing as new strategic priorities have emerged with enlargement on our doorstep, the war in Ukraine, and the needs to move towards sustainable growth and new energy infrastructures. To remain viable and credible, effectiveness, and legality of EU spending must be properly accounted for. Despite the many adaptations in governance, the EU added value (effectiveness) of cohesion funds (35% of the EU budget) is still hard to establish. These developments trigger further scrutiny of the effectiveness and legality of EU spending. 

Member states need to deliver reliable assurances. Independent national authorities can audit each other in teams comparable to practice in other EU policy areas. The EU Commission can use these transparent assurance reports for its annual statements. ECA produces the Annual Report on the EU’s finances to the Council and EP, and ECA writes Special Reports. In its activities it can involve national auditors to strengthen a European culture of independent auditing. For inspiration, attention should be paid to subsidiarity-based governance of monitoring and enforcement in other EU policy areas.

For the time being there seems to be little sense of urgency nor an appetite for structural reforms of cohesion funds. Few have an incentive to reform nor an appetite for strengthening independent auditing. Yet, when it comes to the assessment of national and EU added value, it is doubtful whether the current system of input and output indicators, and reports from the national authorities and from the EU Commission, offer sufficient and reliable insights.

The Author

Adriaan Schout - Clingendael Institute

 The consequences for German-Dutch defence cooperation

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a paradigm shift in the realm of European security and defence. It triggered an unprecedented wave of defence investments throughout Europe. Ironically, Putin thereby set in motion something that consecutive American presidents could not accomplish: raising defence budgets so that European countries would bear a greater share of the financial burden of Europe’s defence. 

One of the most remarkable announcements was the Zeitenwende speech by the German Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz on 27 February 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represented a watershed moment in post-Second World War European history and, in response, Scholz announced that Germany would invest an additional € 100 billion in defence. The question, however, remains whether this announcement would lead to an actual turnaround in German security and defence policy and whether the investments will have a structural or temporal nature. Moreover, one may ask which output will be realised with the extra money available. 

In a similar vein, the question arises what the implications of Germany’s Zeitenwende are for defence cooperation between Germany and its partners. This applies in particular to the Netherlands, considering the far-reaching integration between the German and Dutch land forces. Germany and the Netherlands have a decades-long history of defence cooperation, bilaterally as well as in NATO and EU operations.

This report addresses the potential consequences of the German Zeitenwende for Germany’s role in European security, and more specifically for the German-Dutch defence cooperation. 

The Author

Dick Zandee - Clingendael Institute 

By invading Ukraine in February 2022 Russia has thrown the European security order into the waste bin. In essence, the Western reaction has been ‘we will not fight, but we will support Ukraine in its war effort’. Western countries have delivered a wide variety of weapon systems. Although this support has been vital for Ukraine’s defence, it has resulted in minimum levels of American and European arms and ammunition stocks. As a consequence, the burning question is how to ramp up the defence industrial production, in particular as the armed confrontation in Ukraine has developed into a war of attrition. 

The EU has launched several initiatives to support member states in procuring replacement equipment and ammunition to be delivered to Ukraine. At the same time, European countries have to strengthen their own defence capabilities in order to increase their share of the burden of NATO’s collective defence, while also realising more European autonomy. In the EU, there is broad political support for the strengthening of the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base, not only for economic reasons but as a necessary precondition for Europe’s security. However, despite this urgent call, industrial production is lagging behind, endangering both Ukraine’s war effort and the strengthening of European security and defence. 

This policy brief assesses how the EU is responding to the urgent challenge of adapting its defence industry to the requirements resulting from the new security environment. The central question is what should be done in order to change gear for increasing the production of ammunition and weapon systems. After assessing the consequences of the changed security situation for European capability needs, the author addresses the steps so far taken by the EU and the challenges lying ahead as the war will continue in 2024 and perhaps even beyond. The final section presents ten concrete action lines to overcome the obstacles for ramping and speeding up European defence industrial production.

Author

Dick Zandee - Clingendael Institute

How secure is European maritime trade with the Indo-Pacific? Sea lines of communication between the two regions pass through several chokepoints. This new HCSS report by Benedetta Girardi, Paul van Hooft and Giovanni Cisco traces their role in global supply chains, and offers practical recommendations to enhance maritime security.

The report is published by the HCSS Europe and the Indo-Pacific Hub (EIPH), and part of the series Guarding the Maritime Commons.

Authors:

Benedetta Girardi, Paul van Hooft, Giovanni Cisco. With contributions by Alisa Hoenig.

While the theory and practice of military campaigning has been refined for centuries, there is no dedicated guidance on how to design and implement campaigns to counter hybrid threats for modern security practitioners across government. Meanwhile, existing military planning guidance is not suited for planning complex, non-military counter-hybrid campaigns.

The authors

Sean Monaghan - Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Tim McDonald - Pardee RAND Graduate School

Moldova’s counter-hybrid campaigns have been a “learning by doing exercise”, writes guest author Anastasia Pociumban in this new HCSS paper, providing an empirical review of Moldova’s response to hybrid threats, which significantly increased following Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.

The authors

Anastasia Pociumban - German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) 

In reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian government stood up a variety of digital services and volunteer groups to counter Russia’s aggression in and through cyberspace. This paper by guest author Stefan Soesanto, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, focuses on two Ukrainian hybrid warfare creations and their activities within the period from February 2022 to July 2023: The IT Army of Ukraine (IT-армія України) which are conducting DDoS and destructive cyber operations in and through the cyber domain, and the Internet Force of Ukraine (Інтернет Війська України) who are active on the information warfare front.

Authors

Stefan Soesanto - Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS)

A Dutch case study to bolster European action

The European Union’s Global Gateway investment agenda is gaining traction and political support across the EU bloc, including in the digital domain. This shift in attitude has to be supported by concrete action from member states in identifying their own strengths, as well as local needs in countries of the Global South, as the Netherlands is seeking to do. A key challenge for European players in strengthening their offers to countries of the so-called ‘Global South’ is to know and to act on local needs, engaging with partner countries that also wish to take advantage of the opportunities arising from the digital and data-driven economy. This Policy Brief presents the findings of such a matchmaking exercise, specifically between Dutch digital strengths and local needs in the digital domain in Kenya, Egypt and Vietnam. Hard infrastructure, which is the focus of the EU Global Gateway so far – forms the base of any digital transformation. Building on this, EU member states can offer opportunities in sought-after (sectoral) applications – such as in education, health, agriculture, FinTech or manufacturing – that lay the foundation of an open, inclusive and secure digital domain. Complementing the matchmaking exercise, new (financial) instruments are needed to deliver on the scale of digital needs and interests of partner countries.

Authors

Alexandre Ferreira Gomes, Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute

Maaike Okano-Heijmans, Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute

Towards better understanding of local needs

The digital needs and interests of emerging economies in the Global South remain largely obscure to the EU and most EU member states that wish to strengthen engagement in this important domain by way of the Digital Global Gateway. Strengthened engagement with emerging economies will serve partner countries’ development, and at the same time contribute to European companies’ competitiveness and the spread of liberal digital norms such as openness, transparency and privacy. Exploring the digital needs of three partner countries – namely Kenya, Vietnam and Egypt – this Policy Brief highlights areas for cooperation. A key basic need is hard infrastructure, to which the EU Global Gateway investments are now starting to respond. In order to reap the full benefits of such infrastructure, partner countries are also keen to cooperate on cybersecurity solutions, improving digital skills and digitising micro, small and medium enterprises. Equally important are sectoral solutions – such as in agriculture, digital finance, public transportation, e-government, education and health – that help emerging economies to develop in a secure, inclusive enabling digital environment.

Authors

Alexandre Ferreira Gomes, Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute

Maaike Okano-Heijmans, Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute